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Abstract
The imperative to increase seafood supply while dealing with its overfished local stocks has pushed the European Union
(EU) and its Member States to fish in the Exclusive Economic Zones of other countries through various types of fishing
agreements for decades. Although European public fishing agreements are commented on regularly and considered to be
transparent, this is the first global and historical study on the fee regime that governs them. We find that the EU has
subsidized these agreements at an average of 75% of their cost (financial contribution agreed upon in the agreements),
while private European business interests paid the equivalent of 1.5% of the value of the fish that was eventually landed.
This raises questions of fisheries benefit-sharing and resource-use equity that the EU has the potential to address during the
nearly completed reform of its Common Fisheries Policy.
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Introduction
Although 50% of Atlantic and 80% of Mediterranean marine
resources are estimated to be overfished in European waters [1–3],
Europe’s seafood demand continues to rise. Around 23 kg of
seafood are currently consumed every year by each European
Union (EU) citizen, with an increase of 2% per year [4–5]. The
question of how to satisfy this rising demand, while decreasing its
domestic fishing effort to avoid the collapse of its own fisheries and
limiting its dependence on imports, has been on the EU’s agenda
since the 1950s. The answer was the expansion of the EU fishing
fleet further offshore and southward, often into the waters of
developing countries [6–8]. Currently, a significant part of the EU
catch is realized by a subset of the EU fleet comprised of 700
vessels, of which more than half fish under access agreements in
the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of other countries and the
rest within the High Seas [9–11].
In 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) was adopted, and its Article 62 forced distant-water
fishing countries interested in fishing more (such as member
countries of the EU) to sign fishing access agreements with host
countries having a ‘surplus’ of resource, if they wished to fish
within their 200 nm EEZs [12]. This Article is, however, based on
two ambiguous notions, i.e., (i) that the ‘maximum sustainable
yield’ can be estimated for most stocks in question, which is often
impossible in developing countries [13–15]; and (ii) that the ‘total
catch’ of these countries is known, which has been demonstrated
not to be the case in all countries so far examined [16–22]. Joint
scientific committees and regional fisheries management organi-
zations are currently responsible for assessing the health of
exploited stocks and setting fishing limits for both coastal and
pelagic species targeted under European public fishing access
agreements. However, concerns have been raised about the
efficiency of such committees and organizations, mainly due to
their lack of accessible data and analytical capacity [13,23–24].
Consequently, to date, the vast majority of EU public fishing
access agreements (and probably most agreements with other
distant-water fishing countries) do not mention any quotas, and at
best, refer to a ‘limit of reference’ (which can be exceeded for an
additional payment, without any links to management targets,
such as MSY, or stock status). This creates a loophole that both
distant-water fishing countries and host countries use to maximize
either their catch or their rent, sometimes at the expense of the
resource’s health [25–27]. Indeed, any surpluses for fleets fishing
in developing countries are likely to be lower than assumed. This is
the case for the agreement with Mauritania, for example, which
includes fishing possibilities for sardinella (Sardinella aurita) and
cephalopds (mainly Octopus vulgaris), two overexploited stocks which
together represent more than 50% of the landings of local artisanal
fisheries but for which surpluses no longer exist [28–30].
Given UNCLOS, the EU created a strategic network of publicly
funded fishing access agreements to govern access to valuable
resources and support other private agreements made by its fishing
industry with neighboring developing countries (Figure 1). Since
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the first public agreements between the EU and Guinea-Bissau
and Senegal in 1980, which anticipated the adoption of
UNCLOS, 18 other agreements have been signed throughout
Africa and Oceania. These publicly funded fishing access
agreements are designed to target either tuna and associated
species, or coastal and demersal species (e.g., crustaceans,
cephalopods, small pelagic fish, demersal fish). Most current
agreements in West Africa (Cape Verde, Coˆte d’Ivoire, and Sa˜o
Tome´ and Principe), in East Africa (except Mozambique until
2006), and Oceania strictly focus on tuna species (hereinafter
termed ‘tuna agreements’). On the other hand, early agreements
with West African countries covered mostly coastal and demersal
species, typically with a small tuna component (hereinafter ‘mixed
agreements’).
The distinction between tuna and mixed agreements is
important because tuna agreements focus on pelagic species that
seem to be less impacted by industrial fishing than demersal
species [5]. Also, pelagic species are generally not heavily exploited
by local fishers [6,31], in contrast to the demersal species targeted
by mixed agreements [28,32]. Official EU documents (e.g.,
proposals [33] and working documents [34]) reveal it is likely
that the EU will expand its network of tuna agreements (by signing
new ones such as with the Cook Islands [35] or resuming
previously cancelled ones, such as Gabon [36]), while continuing
to phase out most of the demersal component of mixed
agreements. The EU would, however, still allow the beneficiaries
of current demersal licenses to create joint venture operations or
reflag their fishing vessels [10,37] outside the EU, effectively
reducing the official capacity of the European fleet. Although
beneficial as a means to add local value (e.g., job creation), this
policy is deeply criticized as simply ‘exporting’ excess fishing effort
to developing countries. Therefore, this is unlikely to end in a
reduction of overfishing in many developing countries’ waters
(especially for demersal resources [25,27,38]).
Many studies have focused on fishing agreements worldwide,
and most have suggested that the fees received by host countries
are low compared to the value of what is extracted, irrespective of
the origin of the distant-water fishing country [6,31,39–48].
Recently, however, the situation seems to have improved in the
Pacific [49]. Most of these studies are country- or region-specific,
and usually cover a short period of time. For the European public
fishing access agreements, these studies have had limited policy
implications, although they are important at a local level, since
they provided neither long-term trends nor a global analysis of
these trends. Additionally, the breakdown of total fees paid by both
the EU (i.e., subsidies) and the fishing industry has never been
analyzed at a global scale. Here we provide a comprehensive
analysis of the 33-year period covered by these publicly funded EU
agreements (1980–2012). Focusing on the expanding tuna
agreements, we analyze trends in each fee component (distant-
water fishing country vs. host country, and then EU taxpayers vs.
EU industry) to examine shortcomings related to these agreements
and highlight historical trends, in order to provide ground for a
sound reform of the European public fishing access agreements.
Methods
For all twenty host countries that have been involved at some
point in a public fishing access agreement with the EU, we
retrieved all related official texts (namely, ‘council regulations/
decisions’, ‘agreements’, ‘protocols’, and ‘information on the date
of entry into force’) from the EU law database (http://eur-lex.
europa.eu; also available in print). From these documents, we
extracted the following data and information: (i) EEZ access fees
and development aid (paid by EU taxpayers); (ii) fishing fees (paid
by EU industry, either per tonne of fish or per unit of vessel
capacity); (iii) fleet capacity; and (iv) specific ‘quotas’ and ‘limits of
reference’ (both referred to as ‘quotas’ throughout this paper,
although ‘limits of reference’ can be exceeded in exchange for
Figure 1. Extent of publicly funded EU fishing agreements with developing countries. Distribution of the twenty public agreements that
the EU has signed with developing countries throughout Africa and Oceania in the 1980s (red), 1990s (yellow) and 2000s (green). EU vessels also have
the possibility to freely fish in EU waters (represented by grey areas, including overseas territories with the exception of the Chagos Archipelago, in
cross-hatch, which is now fully protected). Some of these agreements have been cancelled (Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Guinea-
Bissau, Guinea, Senegal; highlighted with black crosses) or are currently being renegotiated (Mauritania, Mauritius, Micronesia, Morocco, Solomon
Islands; highlighted with black squares). Situation as of December 2012.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079899.g001
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additional payment), if available. This was done for each gear type
or target species, country, and year (see Table S1 and
References S1 for each country’s references).
This information was mostly collected from the ‘protocols’,
although some of this information was only found in the
‘agreements’ for the earlier time-period. ‘Council regulations/
decisions’ were mostly used to determine whether a renewed
agreement was similar to its previous iteration, and ‘information
on the date of entry into force’ documents were used to determine
whether an agreement was active or not during any given year.
To produce a harmonized database, we then standardized the
following units:
Vessel Capacity
Gross Tonnage (GT) is the unit adopted by the International
Convention on Tonnage Measurement of Ships in 1969 and
entered into force in 1982. However, it seems that the use of this
unit has not been enforced, as nearly all EU agreements used
Gross Registered Tonnage (GRT). Therefore, we deemed a GT to
GRT conversion (i.e., GRT is used in this paper as the common
capacity unit) to be the best way to minimize our margin of error
for the three countries whose fleet capacity was given in GT
(Morocco from 2006 to present; Coˆte d’Ivoire from 2004 to
present; and Mauritania from 1996 to present for non-tuna pelagic
vessels, and then from 2006 to present for all other vessels). We are
aware that GRT is not the best unit for discussing fishing capacity.
For example, demersal trawlers are best defined by power of their
engine, which drag their gear at the bottom of the ocean, while
tuna vessels are better defined by the volume of their hold, which
determines how long they can operate. However, GRT was the
only unit we could use here to have a consistent fishing capacity
unit, while limiting the number of assumptions and conversions.
Thus, we extracted records for which both GT and GRT were
given (all countries) from the EU fleet registry (http://ec.europa.
eu/fisheries/fleet), and kept records for (i) demersal gears (i.e.,
‘beam trawls’, ‘bottom other trawls’, ‘bottom pair trawls’, ‘boat
dredges’, ‘mechanized dredges’, ‘otter twin trawls’, ‘combined
gillnets/trammelnets’, ‘set longlines’, and ‘set gillnets’; n = 25,423);
and (ii) pelagic gears (i.e., ‘Danish seines’, ‘encircling gillnets’, ‘pair
seines’, ‘purse seines’, ‘Scottish seines’; n = 3,175). We then
performed a linear regression between GT and GRT for these
two categories of gears (Figure S1; residuals were tested for
normality in R and are presented in Figure S2), which we used to
convert the GT given in the aforementioned agreements into
GRT.
Furthermore, most tuna vessel capacities were provided only in
number of vessels. To convert these numbers to GRT capacities,
we used the correspondences between these two units provided for
the 1980s in a handful of agreement documents (purse seiners:
Guinea 1983 [50], Guinea-Bissau 1983 and 1986 [51–52],
Senegal 1988 [53–54], Gambia 1990 [55–56] (we used the
combination of the two consecutive protocols to estimate the mean
GRT per purse seiner in the cases of Senegal and Gambia);
‘liners’, i.e., pole-and-line and longline vessels: Guinea 1983 [50],
Guinea-Bissau 1983 and 1986 [51–52], Angola 1989 [57]). In
order to get an additional anchor point for 2012, we calculated the
geometric mean of the GRT per seiner, based on the list of seiners
active in 2012 under EU agreements (provided by the Observatoire
Thonier, Institut de Recherche pour le De´veloppement, Se`te,
France), and GRT data available in the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization’s ‘fishing vessels finder’ database
(http://www.fao.org/figis/vrmf/finder/search/#stats). For liners,
for which no such list was available, we instead computed the
geometric mean of the tonnage of the 50 largest EU vessels
(deemed to be representative of the EU industrial fleet; only 47
records available in the case of WCPFC) from each database of the
three regional fisheries management organizations under which
EU agreements operate (Atlantic Ocean: ICCAT; Indian Ocean:
IOTC; Pacific Ocean: WCPFC). For each vessel type, we then
fitted an exponential regression (Figure 2), which we used to
convert numbers of vessels to GRT capacities (due to the low
number of data points, we did not perform any analyses of the
normality of the residuals).
Finally, non-tuna vessel capacity was also provided in numbers
of vessels in seven cases, and we used correspondences given in
other agreements for the same type of gear or species at the same
period, and as much as possible, in the same region. A summary is
provided in Table S2.
Fees
In order to account for inflation over a given time-period, it is
necessary to convert nominal values (i.e., the actual price in a
given year) to real values that are comparable. All values in this
paper are therefore given in real 2012 EUR (1 EUR = 1.28 USD),
rather than nominal EUR.
From a European perspective, this conversion of the fees from
nominal to real values required us to apply a Consumer Price
Index (CPI) ‘deflator’ to nominal values:
Real valuei~
nominal valuei
CPIi
CPI2012
ð1Þ
where i represents the year for which the nominal value is
converted into 2012 real value.
We extracted annual CPI data from the International Monetary
Fund’s World Economic Outlook (http://www.imf.org/external/
Figure 2. Trends of EU vessels’ Gross Registered Tonnage
(GRT). Estimated mean annual capacity in GRT of A) tuna seiners and B)
tuna liners (i.e., pole-and-line and longline vessels) deployed by the EU
fleet from 1980 to 2012, suggesting that the mean GRT per vessel
increases by 1.4% and 2.8% annually, respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079899.g002
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pubs/ft/weo/2012/02/weodata/index.aspx) for ‘Advanced Econ-
omies’. Note that this ‘Advanced Economies’ time-series exists for
the entire 1980–2012 period, in contrast to Eurostat’s time-series
of harmonized CPI for ‘Eurogroup’ (http://epp.eurostat.ec.
europa.eu/portal/page/portal/hicp/data/database). However,
these two time-series are very similar for the common 1992–
2012 period, and thus we used the former.
Estimating the real value of the fees received by the host
countries required that we performed one additional step. First,
nominal EUR had to be converted to local currency units (LCU;
exchange rates extracted from http://databank.worldbank.org;
2012 rates extracted from www.fxtop.com, up to October 2012)
via US dollars, to which the host countries’ CPI was then applied,
following Equation 1. However, host countries’ CPI time-series
were not complete in the World Bank database, and we had to
perform several interpolations to fill gaps, as presented in Table
S3 (final values are provided in Dataset S1).
This methodology is thought to represent an improvement on a
preliminary estimate of Madagascar’s income [31], as we believe it
estimates more accurately what host countries perceive they
received over time by accounting more effectively for the inflation
and money devaluation in host countries. It was developed
following discussions with the European Directorate of Maritime
Affairs and Fisheries (DG-MARE) and several colleagues. How-
ever, we note that although this new method provides a more
accurate view of what a host country perceives it received, it does
not change either the overall trend nor the discussion implied by
such trends (at least in the case of Madagascar; see Figure S3).
Finally, global ex-vessel prices for the main species of tuna
(yellowfin: Thunnus albacares and skipjack: Katsuwonus pelamis), as
well as small pelagic fish, demersal fish species, shrimps and other
crustaceans, and cephalopods were also extracted from a
worldwide ex-vessel price database for the 1980–2006 period
[58–59]. These ex-vessel prices were only collected for coastal
countries of the European Union (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the UK), as we assumed
they were the ones mainly contributing to/benefiting from public
EU fishing agreements. These ex-vessel prices, originally in
nominal USD, were converted to 2012 EUR using annual
USD-EUR exchange rates and Advanced Economies’ CPIs (from
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, respec-
tively). They are provided in Dataset S1 and were used to
estimate the ratio of ‘fees paid by the industry/gross revenue
generated’.
We provide the final dataset in the appended Excel workbook
(Dataset S1), as well as references for each country and year in
Table S1 and References S1. Dataset S1 also includes
comments to explain specific assumptions when the general
methods presented here did not apply to a specific fleet, country
and/or year.
Results
Agreements and Authorized Fishing Effort
The number of European public fishing access agreements
steeply increased after the implementation of the Common
Fisheries Policy in 1983, from two during the 1980–1983 period
(Senegal and Guinea-Bissau) to 16 in 1991 (Figure 3A).
Subsequently, their numbers have mostly oscillated between 12
and 16. Since 2010, however, the total number of agreements
steadily decreased to nine, notably because of difficulties to
approve (e.g., Morocco, Micronesia) or renew some of them (e.g.,
Mauritius, Senegal), but also due to political instability (e.g.,
agreement with Guinea suspended in 2009). Their number is
currently increasing again, as evidenced by the recent number of
renewals and hints about new agreements being negotiated [33–
36].
The changes in the number of agreements produced a pattern
similar to that of the authorized fishing capacity, which rapidly
increased from 40,000 GRT/year in the early 1980s to an average
of just below 800,000 GRT/year over the 1990–2012 period
(Figure 3B). However, overall fishing capacity declined since
2000, from over 900,000 GRT/year to slightly below 600,000
GRT/year in 2012, mainly due to the phasing out of mixed
agreements, but also due to a more recent decline in the number of
tuna agreements (or number of licenses available for each). Indeed,
the fishing capacity of the fleet involved in mixed agreements
continuously declined from around 250,000 GRT/year to below
100,000 GRT/year over the 1990–2012 period (Figure 3B). The
fishing capacity of the tuna fleet seems to be increasing overall,
although it peaked in the early 2000s at around 750,000 GRT/
year and then decreased to slightly below 500,000 GRT in 2012.
EU Subsidies
Some countries (but certainly not Russia: http://ec.europa.eu/
commission_2010-2014/damanaki/headlines/press-releases/
2013/04/2010426_en.htm) or individuals may not consider the
fees paid by the EU to be fisheries subsidies. However, they clearly
confer a benefit to the fishing industry, thus meeting the World
Trade Organization’s definition of subsidies [60]. These subsidies
– paid by the EU taxpayers for each GRT allowed to fish in host
countries’ waters – declined by half between 1980 and 1985 (from
around 200 EUR/GRT/year [256 USD/GRT/year] to 100
EUR/GRT/year [128 USD/GRT/year]), then further declined
to approximately 50 EUR/GRT/year (64 USD/GRT/year) in
the 2000s (Figure 4A). The wide ribbon around the median
(which corresponds to the limits beyond which any data point
Figure 3. Number of agreements and authorized capacity.
Trends of A) the number of EU public fishing agreements signed with
developing countries in Africa and Oceania, and B) authorized capacity
of the tuna fleet (dark grey) and other fleets (light grey; mostly demersal
fishing, but also includes some non-tuna pelagic fishing with various
types of lines and nets), from 1980 to 2012, by month. The
implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its three
reforms (the third one being ongoing) are indicated by black arrows.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079899.g003
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would be considered as an outlier, i.e., data points below
quartile121.5*[quartile3 – quartile2], or above quartile3+1.5*[-
quartile3– quartile2]) illustrates the difference in the level of
subsidies provided by each of the agreements. Indeed, this level of
subsidies ranges from 11 EUR/GRT/year for Comoros to 1,816
EUR/GRT/year for Morocco (Table 1), and is above the 100
EUR/GRT/year threshold for only four other countries (i.e.,
Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, Angola, Mauritania; all involved in mixed
agreements). Figure S3 provides a breakdown of subsidies by
country, and shows that the level of EU subsidies increased clearly
over the entire time-period only for EU vessels fishing in Angola
(agreement stopped in 2004), Guinea-Bissau and Mauritania.
From the host countries’ perspective, the trend is fairly similar, as
only Guinea-Bissau, Mauritania, Sa˜o Tome´ and Principe, and
Senegal (agreement stopped in 2006) saw their financial income
increase (although generally not over the last decade; Figure S3).
EU Tuna Industry Fees
The comparison of the fees paid by the fishing industry to the
landed value allowed us to estimate the revenue of the industry, in
the context of increasingly widespread tuna agreements. The fees
paid by the industry (i.e., approximately 25% of the total value of
the agreements; see section above and Figure 4B) consistently
represented less than 2% of its gross revenue (i.e., ‘ex-vessel price’
multiplied by ‘quota’). After an initial decrease from 2% in 1985 to
around 0.8% in 1995, this percentage again increased to about 2%
after the second reform of the Common Fisheries Policy
(Figure 5). The wider ribbon around the median (which
corresponds to the limits beyond which any data point would be
considered as an outlier, i.e., data points below quartile121.5*[-
quartile3 – quartile2], or above quartile3+1.5*[quartile3 – quar-
tile2]) over the past decade is mainly the result of higher fees
negotiated in the Pacific, especially for Kiribati and Micronesia
(Table 1).
EU Demersal Industry Fees
For the demersal component of mixed agreements, it was not
possible to globally estimate the historic industry’s fee/gross
revenue ratio as computed for the tuna agreements (‘EU tuna
industry fees’ section). Indeed, fees were provided in EUR/GRT/
year and ex-vessel prices in EUR/t, while quotas were unavailable
for virtually all countries and agreements. However, a detailed
analysis of the country with the largest remaining mixed
agreement, Mauritania, provides some insights. These results will
therefore be seen as conservative, as the declared catch
corresponds to the actual catch in the best-case scenario. However,
there is often an un-reported or mis-reported component,
therefore understating the benefits received by the fishing sector
[42].
Over the 2008–2010 period, Mauritania received 80–95 million
EUR/year of EU subsidies, which resulted in the export of 130–
160,000 GRT/year in Mauritanian waters and total landings of
260–330,000 t/year (mainly small pelagics, but also octopuses,
shrimps, and black hakes [61,62]). On average, European
taxpayers therefore paid 290 EUR/t of landed seafood. On the
other hand, the industry paid between 9 EUR/t and 507 EUR/t
of landed seafood, for small pelagics and crustaceans other than
lobsters and crabs, respectively. In the newest agreement [63] -
currently pending approval by the European Parliament - fees
have steeply increased, and the EU industry expressed disquiet
about this change, claiming this agreement was not worthwhile
anymore [64–65].
We estimated the value of these catches (‘declared catch’
multiplied by ‘ex-vessel price’ = gross revenue) and calculated the
ratio of ‘fees paid by the industry/gross revenue’. It appears that
the industry has paid fees representing around 3.2% of their gross
revenue from 2008 to 2010 (Table 2), which is almost twice as
high as for tuna (see above).
Discussion
Overall, the subsidies spent by taxpayers to grant the EU fishing
industry the access to waters of host countries represent
approximately 75% of the total value of the agreements for which
such a ratio could be estimated (i.e., only agreements with quotas
for their tuna component; Figure 4B). It can be argued, thus, that
these subsidies allowed the maintenance of high fishing capacity by
the EU in foreign waters. The high fishing effort that these
subsidies generate is likely to have had detrimental effects on both
the fish resources and fisheries development of host countries [25–
27,66–67]. Also, this high level of subsidization essentially means
that the European consumer pays for the fish twice: once when it is
caught, and again when it is bought. It could be argued that these
agreements provide European consumers with cheaper fish.
However, this is likely not the case, since European markets are
supplied not only by the fleet fishing under such agreements [38],
and prices of seafood are, to a large extent, globally harmonized in
this market.
Figure 4. Level of public subsidies in EU agreements. Trend of A)
the subsidies paid by the EU taxpayers per unit of capacity (2012 EUR/
GRT/year) for all agreements; and B) the level of subsidies for both
mixed (dark grey) and tuna (light grey) agreements. Panel B) only
includes agreements for which there were tuna quotas. In both panels,
the solid lines represent the median, while the colored areas represent
the limit beyond which a point is considered to be an outlier [data
points below quartile121.5*(quartile3 – quartile2), or above quarti-
le3+1.5*(quartile3 – quartile2). The ‘smooth.spline’ function in R was
used [82], with a smoothing window ‘spar’ set to 0.5]. Panel A is based
on 397 ‘country/year’ datapoints, while panel B is based on 157
‘country/year’ datapoints for the tuna agreements and 67 ‘country/year’
datapoints for the mixed agreements. The implementation of the
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its three reforms (the third one
being ongoing) are indicated by black arrows.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079899.g004
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Our estimates of the fees paid by the industry relative to the fees
paid by the European taxpayers (i.e., ,25%) and the value of the
industry fees relative to gross revenue (i.e., ,1.5%) should be
considered as conservative. First, the industry commonly does not
use all annual fishing rights agreed upon in the agreements [68],
while the EU usually still pays 100% of the EEZ access fees and
development aid [69–70]. Therefore, it can be assumed that the
industry commonly pays less than 25% of the total cost of these
agreements. Second, there is increasingly widespread commercial
use of bycatch and non-targeted species, such as sharks [23,31]
(exclusively targeted for their fins), which are not included in the
industry’s fee. Therefore, the industry likely pays less than 1.5% of
the overall landed value. The industry may argue here that they
often pay licenses for fishing rights they do not use, but we believe
that the overall impact on the global fee is low. Furthermore, as
noted above, there is also often an un-reported or mis-reported
component that understates the benefit of the industry (e.g., in the
mid-2000s for the agreement with the Seychelles [71]). Further-
more, current partnership agreements only refer to the major
targeted species. Thus, these committees and organizations do not
focus on associated species or catches that are either discarded, or
increasingly targeted when valuable. In some cases, bycatch
species may even constitute an important or major part of total
landings, often including overexploited or threatened resources.
This is the case for many Mauritanian demersal fish stocks
exploited as bycatch by Spanish shrimp trawlers, but not
considered in the agreements and not accounted for in the
financial compensation [28–29,61,72]. Based on recently collected
evidence (e.g., records of Mozambican catches landed in South
Africa [http://transparentsea.co/images/8/8a/Durban_landings.
pdf] and European Commission data for Madagascar and
Mozambique [http://transparentsea.co/images/d/dc/DG-
MARE_sharks_lettre.pdf]), it appears that such free ‘side activities’
have become very important for some operators in the Indian
Ocean, where Spanish longliners mostly target sharks [31,73–74].
Table 1. Mean level of subsidies received by host countries over the period of their respective agreements, as well as mean fee
paid by the industry per tonne of tuna over the 2008–2012 period.
Country Subsidies (2012 EUR/GRT/year) Tuna industry feea (2012 EUR/t)
Morocco 1,816 26.2
Mauritania 463 33.8
Angola 418 –
Senegal 247 –
Guinea-Bissau 159 31.2
Seychelles 86 35.0
Guinea 85 29.2
Solomon Islands 63 40.2
Kiribati 59 58.3
Mozambique 56 39.0
Micronesia 52 48.4
Equatorial Guinea 36 –
Gambia 29 –
Coˆte d’Ivoire 26 36.4
Gabon 23 36.7
Madagascar 23 36.4
Cape Verde 20 36.4
Sa˜o Tome´ and Principe 19 36.4
Mauritius 17 –
Comoros 11 43.8
aLiners usually pay lower fees than purse-seiners. Although purse-seiners catches are higher than that of liners, both gear types were given the same weight here.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079899.t001
Figure 5. Cost of tuna agreements for the industry. Ratio of fees
paid by the industry relative to landed value for the tuna component of
all agreements. This figure only includes agreements for which there
were tuna quotas. The solid line represents the median, while the grey
area represents the limit beyond which a point is considered to be an
outlier [data points below quartile121.5*(quartile3–quartile2), or above
quartile3+1.5*(quartile3–quartile2). The ‘smooth.spline’ function in R was
used [82], with a smoothing window ‘spar’ set to 0.5]. Note that for
2012, we considered the ex-vessel price of tuna to be 2,000 EUR/t,
based on historical trends and various sources of information. This
graph is based on 218 ‘country/year’ datapoints. Note that liners usually
pay lower fees and also have lower catches than purse-seiners;
however, both gear types were given the same weight here (the
difference between weighted and non-weighted results was minimal).
The implementation of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) and its three
reforms (the third one being ongoing) are indicated by black arrows.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079899.g005
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This targeted bycatch therefore represents an important part of
the industry’s gross revenue and must be accounted for during the
negotiation of financial compensation.
Although there are operating costs that the industry must cover
(e.g., wages, fuel, taxes), it is expected that the net benefit accrued
to the industry represents a sizeable part of the gross revenue,
hence there is some room to raise the industry fishing fees. To
assess what would be a ‘fair’ fee is a political decision requiring
better understanding of the profits made by fishing firms operating
under these access agreements. However, because account books
are kept private, it is currently extremely difficult to estimate the
industry’s net benefits, thus indirect methods via (global) fishing
cost [75] and ex-vessel price databases [58–59] would be required.
Interestingly, a senior representative of the French tuna fleet
recently publicly acknowledged that the fee paid by the industry is
low and that it would be reasonable to set it at up to 7% of the
landed value [76–77]. This is a goal that host countries may
consider right away. In approaching this issue, host countries in
West Africa and the Indian Ocean could learn from the South
Pacific Tuna Treaty, in which host countries are organized into a
cartel-like organization [39], giving them more leverage to
negotiate higher fishing fees. It is worth noting that Indian Ocean
countries engaged in the current discussion about future regional
allocation of quotas are heading towards adopting such a system.
Removing subsidies and increasing benefit-sharing may also help
ensure that the fishing fleet stays at a more sustainable size.
Overall, while one can argue that the amount host countries
receive is not always negligible, EU agreements have clearly
benefited the fishing industry more than the host countries. This
discrepancy raises concerns of equitability and contradicts stated
EU development goals, which suggests benefits from these
agreements should be shared between both parties, not mainly
directed towards private EU interests [34]. The current situation is a
result of the ‘value for money’ requirement by the Court of Auditors
[70], and therefore EU fishing agreements are business agreements
above anything else. Harmonizing regulations among the various
Directorate Generals would allow the creation of strengthened
partnership [38], which could in turn help to ensure that host
countries are less inclined to replace EU agreements with more
opaque private business agreements or joint ventures, or agreements
with countries that are less transparent or accountable in their
agreements and negotiations (such as China [44]). Examples of this
behaviour can be found, for example, in Mauritania [78–79] and
Senegal [80]. Note that joint ventures can be perceived by host
countries as more beneficial than foreign fishing access agreements,
because they generate more local value, for example, through the
construction of local processing plants and the creation of associated
jobs [47]. It could be argued whether or not it would be in the
interest of the EU to directly subsidize the development of a
domestic fleet or joint ventures, which will in turn negatively impact
the fishing opportunities offered to the EU distant fleet.
Conclusion
Over the past few years, the EU has reiterated its wish to fish
more sustainably and equitably [34], but also to expand its
network of tuna agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific
countries. Sizeable improvements have already been achieved
since the first agreements, for example, through clauses related to
monitoring, local processing, and employment of local crew. Most
of these improvements occurred with the shift from ‘fishing
agreements’ to ‘fisheries partnership agreements’ in 2004 [38,81].
However, much remains to be done with the creation of
‘sustainable fisheries agreements’ in the context of the 2012–
2014 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy. If the EU intends to
honor its stated goals, it needs to ensure that its fishing agreements
(and subsequent EU fleet behaviour) are equitable, fair, enforced,
and do not jeopardize the health of fish resources, or artificially
channel benefits towards EU industrial beneficiaries.
During the remaining months of 2013 and in early 2014, the
EU will determine its fishing policy for the forthcoming decade
through the reform of its Common Fisheries Policy, and we hope
that it will act in accordance with its stated public goals. The EU
has the potential to become a global leader in equitable and
sustainable fishing, especially given its existing attempts to move in
this direction through the elimination of mixed agreements and
the addition of various beneficial clauses in its remaining
agreements. However, there are numerous advances that would
need to be made to ensure a more balanced and equitable
arrangement between the EU and the host countries. We hope
that this study helps to clarify the rationale for taking such steps.
Supporting Information
Figure S1 Correlation between Gross Registered Ton-
nage (GRT) and Gross Tonnage (GT). Linear regression of
Table 2. Baseline data and estimate of the ‘total fee/gross revenue’ ratio for the mixed agreement with Mauritania over the 2008–
2010 period (details are shown in the appended Dataset S1; ‘Calculations Mauritania’ spreadsheet).
Name of fishing category
Ex-vessel
price (2012 EUR/t)
Declared
catch (t/year)
Total fee
(2012 EUR)a
Total fee/gross
revenue (%)
Official In this paper
Crustaceans except lobsters and crabs Other crustaceans 12,814 3,358 1,601,850 4.0
Black hake Black hake 4,041 3,974 290,924 1.8
Non-trawlers demersal vessels
fishing species other than black hake
Demersal vessels 5,183 1,841 192,310 2.0
Cephalopods Demersal vessels 5,183 10,326 3,486,526 7.5
Pelagic vessels (freezer) Pelagic vessels 803 272,440 5,314,779 2.4
Crabs Other crustaceans 6,562 134 33,694 3.9
Pelagic vessels (wet) Pelagic vessels 803 4,384 88,612 1.1
a‘Total fee’ was calculated by multiplying the fee per unit of fishing capacity (in 2012 EUR/GT) by the amount of capacity (GT) reported to have been used in each fishing
category [61].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079899.t002
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the records collected from the EU vessel registry (http://ec.
europa.eu/fisheries/fleet) for which tonnages in both GT and
GRT were available. Panel A) corresponds to demersal gears
(n = 25,423), while B) represents pelagic gears (n = 3,175). In both
cases, there is a strong correlation between the two parameters GT
and GRT (r2 = 0.94 for demersal gears, and r2 = 0.98 for demersal
gears). Note that neither GRT nor GT are normally distributed, as
there are fewer vessels with higher tonnages (i.e., the distribution of
the tonnage is skewed towards 0). The analysis of normality of the
residuals is presented in Figure S2.
(TIF)
Figure S2 Analysis of the residuals of the linear
regression presented in Figure S1. Panel A) and B)
correspond to demersal gears (n = 25,423), while C) and D)
represent pelagic gears (n = 3,175). Panels A) and C) show that the
accuracy of our GRT estimates diminish when GT increases, and
the right panels show that the residuals have a distribution that is
relatively normal (perfect normality would be obtained if all points
were on the horizontal line). Although there are a few residuals
that deviate from normality, they did not impact our parameter
estimation, given the large sample size (n).
(TIF)
Figure S3 Trend of EU subsidies by country. Country-
breakdown of normalized EU subsidies in real value, seen from the
EU’s perspective (thick line; 2012 EUR/GRT) and that of the host
countries (thin line; 2012 LCU/GRT). The Pearson correlation
coefficient r between these two time-series is given for each country
(*indicates p-value,0.001; the sample size for each country, i.e.,
the number of years for which there was an agreement, is provided
in Table S1). For 13 out of 20 countries, there is a statistically
significant, strong correlation (r.0.70) between the subsidies paid
by the EU taxpayers (in 2012 EUR/GRT) and what the host
countries perceive they received (in 2012 LCU/GRT). The EU
has clearly decreased its subsidies to 11 of these countries (at least
in the last decade), which also translated into decreasing income
for the host countries.
(TIF)
Table S1 References for official documents used to collect data,
and summary of the correspondences between names in each of
these official texts and the database.
(DOCX)
Table S2 Correspondence between the number of vessels and
GRT capacities for non-tuna vessels.
(DOCX)
Table S3 Assumptions made to fill the gaps in the CPI time-
series.
(DOCX)
Dataset S1 Data extracted from the 1980–2012 European
Union’s fishing access agreements, aggregated by gear type or
species group. The first tab of the dataset (‘Data’) contains the
fishing effort, the quotas/limits of reference, the industrial fees,
and the EU subsidies, for each month a given country had an
active agreement with the European Union. The ‘Data’ tab also
contains various parameters used for our calculations, such as CPI
and exchange rates. The following tabs contain the pivot tables
used to aggregate the data shown in Figures 4A–B, 5, and S3, as
well as Table 2.
(XLSX)
References S1 References used in Table S1 and Table S2.
(DOCX)
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